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 1 
ABSTRACT: 2 
Several studies have been using quantified consensus within climate science as an argument to 3 
foster climate policy. Recent efforts to communicate such scientific consensus attained a high 4 
public profile but it is doubtful if they can be regarded successful. We argue that repeated efforts to 5 
VKRUHXSWKHVFLHQWLILFFRQVHQVXVRQPLQLPDOLVWFODLPVVXFKDVµKXPDQVFDXVHJOREDOZDUPLQJ¶DUH6 
distractions from more urgent matters of knowledge, values, policy framing and public 7 
engagement.  Such efforts to force policy progress through communicating scientific consensus 8 
misunderstand the relationship between scientific knowledge, publics and policymakers. More 9 
important is to focus on genuinely controversial issues within climate policy debates where 10 
expertise might play a facilitating role. Mobilising expertise in policy debates calls for judgment, 11 
context and attention to diversity, rather than deferring to formal quantifications of narrowly 12 
scientific claims.  13 
 14 
INTRODUCTION 15 
Quantification of consensus within climate science continues to occupy a central role in public 16 
discussions of climate change, with a particular focus on the level of agreement regarding the 17 
anthropogenic contribution to global temperature rise. Since 2004, a series of papers have addressed 18 
this issue (Oreskes, 2004; Anderegg et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2013; Verheggen et al., 2014). One of 19 
these (Cook et al., 2013) (C13) has gained particular prominence with the claim that 97.1% of those 20 
papers expressing a position on anthropogenic global warming either explicitly states or implies that 21 
humans cause warming. The claim has had significant media impact (Skeptical Science, 2014), 22 
inspired a popular television comedy programme (Kelly, 2014), been adjudged Environmental 23 
5HVHDUFK/HWWHUV¶EHVWDUWLFOHIRU.DPPHQ, 2013), and even been tweeted by President 24 
 2 
Obama (Obama, DOEHLWHPEHOOLVKLQJ&¶VRULJLQDOFODLPZLWKWKHZRUGµGDQJHURXV¶ 1 
Consensus quantification is justified by arguing that public ignorance of consensus amongst climate 2 
scientists provides a barrier to the implementation of climate change mitigation policy (Oreskes, 3 
2004; Anderegg et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2013; Verheggen et al., 2014). Here, we argue that 4 
focusing on consensus amongst experts as a route to policy progress misunderstands the role of 5 
scientific knowledge in public affairs and policymaking. Drawing on examples from the extensive 6 
science and technology studies (STS) literature, we show that building the basis for policy action 7 
cannot be done simply with appeals to fact. Where these facts are complex and negotiated, as in the 8 
case of climate change, experts and policymakers need to acknowledge and engage more actively 9 
ZLWKSXEOLFµPDWWHUVRIFRQFHUQ¶/DWRXU, 2004). 10 
SCIENCE 11 
Nowhere is the social negotiation of fact clearer than in the case of C13 itself. The publication of 12 
the article prompted a long-running and robust debate on blogs (e.g. «DQG7KHQ7KHUH¶V3K\VLFV13 
2014; Pile, 2013; Nuccitelli, 2013; Hulme, 2014), within the pages of scientific journals (Tol, 2014; 14 
2016; Cook et al., 2014; Cook & Cowtan, 2015; Duarte, 2014) and even in the US Congress 15 
(Vaidyanathan, 2014).  One focus of discussion has been the high proportion of abstracts in C13 16 
without a position, when compared with the previous consensus study conducted by Oreskes 17 
%RWKVWXGLHVUDWHDEVWUDFWVµEXWZKHUH2UHVNHVILQGVDJUHHPHQWDQGQRSRVLWLRQ18 
Cook has 33% agreement, 66% no position and 1% disagrHHPHQW¶7RO, 2016). In fact, C13 re-19 
analysed the sample used by Oreskes based on their methodology. They found a wide discrepancy: 20 
µ2IWKH>SDSHUV@QRQHUHMHFWHGWKHFRQVHQVXVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK2UHVNHV¶UHVXOW2UHVNHV21 
determined that 75% of papers endorsed the consensus, based on the assumption that mitigation and 22 
impact papers implicitly endorse the consensus. By comparison, we found that 28% of the 894 23 
DEVWUDFWVHQGRUVHG$*:ZKLOHH[SUHVVHGQRSRVLWLRQ¶&RRNHWDO 24 
 3 
 1 
We do not wish to adjudicate on this disagreement here. Rather, these arguments demonstrate the 2 
pitfalls of attempting to quantify consensus in the scientific literature in the manner of C13 in order 3 
WRSURGXFHµSURRI¶IRUSHUVXDGLQJWKHSXEOLF5DWKHUWKDQVHFXULQJFHUtainty that was absent before, 4 
this exercise has invited intense scrutiny to the judgments underpinning their claim, and generated 5 
further doubt. This was a predictable outcome on the basis of STS studies which show that doing 6 
more research on politically controversial, high-stakes policy matters typically increases uncertainty 7 
(Collingridge & Reeve, 1986). This happens as different parties are motivated to undercut each 8 
RWKHU¶VFODLPVDQGWKHFRPSOH[LW\RIVFLHQWLILFMXGJPHQWOHQGVLWVHOIWRJHQHUDWLQJHQdless 9 
disagreement on technical grounds (Sarewitz, 2004). Contributing to public debate and policy 10 
therefore calls for a more cosmopolitan approach to climate knowledge where the limits of 11 
scientific resolution to intractable disputes are acknowledged and efforts made to communicate and 12 
engage with the implications of different positions, not all derived from science (Beck, 2012). This 13 
brings us to the rationale for consensus quantification, not only as a means of communication 14 
within the scientific community, but also as a means of public communication and persuasion.   15 
 16 
PUBLICS 17 
The argument for quantifying the scientific consensus on climate change is often made in terms of 18 
better informing a misinformed public. For example, proponents use opinion poll evidence to argue 19 
that there is a "significant gap between public perceptions and reality, with 57% of the US public 20 
either disagreeing or unaware that scientists overwhelmingly agree that the earth is warming due to 21 
human activity" (Cook et al., 2013, p. 6), and that this misperception is a result of misinformation 22 
spread by opponents of climate policies (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Since the public seems 23 
unaware that such a science consensus exists, consensus communicators seek to publicize its 24 
 4 
existence.  Following experimental evidence from psychology, this gap is believed to be associated 1 
with reduced support for a range of climate policies (Ding et al., 2011) and that this gap can be 2 
closed by providing effective information regarding the extent of consensus within climate science 3 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2013). However, these experimental findings have been challenged in two 4 
ways in the literature. First, if increasing (consensual) scientific knowledge merely accentuates the 5 
FXOWXUDO³FRQIOLFWRILQWHUHVW´ZLWKLn some individuals (Kahan et al., 2012), then climate science 6 
knowledge need not be the only basis upon which climate-friendly policies can be advocated. 7 
Second, if one treats the history of research and public communication of climate consensus as a 8 
naturDOH[SHULPHQWWKHQWKHSHUVLVWHQFHRIWKHµFRQVHQVXVJDS¶VXJJHVWVFRQVHQVXVPHVVDJLQJKDV9 
limited efficacy (Kahan, 2015). A more recent study acknowledges the influence of political 10 
ideology and cultural values in shaping attitudes about climate, but stiOODUJXHVWKDWµWKHSRVLWLYH11 
effect of climate information (or conversely, the negative effect of misinformation) still plays a 12 
VLJQLILFDQWUROHLQLQIOXHQFLQJFOLPDWHOLWHUDF\OHYHOV¶Cook, 2016, p. 5).  13 
Here, consensus messaging is argued to be important because even people with left-liberal views do 14 
not know the correct level of scientific consensus.  It is also argued that it is important to refute 15 
misinformation, since this is the mechanism through which beneficial framings and correct 16 
information aboXWFOLPDWHDUHEHLQJµQHXWUDOL]HG¶, p. 13). The scholarly debate about 17 
consensus messaging is intense but based on a relatively small pool of researchers and published 18 
papers. Debates within psychology, and broader debates about the usefulness of laboratory studies 19 
in assessing efficacy present a picture of an emerging field of study that has yet to reach a 20 
µFRQVHQVXVRQFRQVHQVXV¶ 21 
 22 
Even if one were to identify the precise effect of consensus messaging as a variable in climate 23 
communication, the fact remains that in many fields of climate change research scientific consensus 24 
 5 
is elusive. Scientific consensus exists among some relevant, small communities (for example, 1 
attribution studies leading to affirm AGW), but there are many fields relevant to climate change 2 
impacts where such a consensus does not hold. For example, the IPCC reported in its Fifth 3 
$VVHVVPHQW5HSRUWWKDW³>Q@REHVWHVWLPDWHIRUHTXLOLEULXPFOLPDWHVHQVLWLYLW\FDQQRZEHJLYHQ4 
because of DODFNRIDJUHHPHQWRQYDOXHVDFURVVDVVHVVHGOLQHVRIHYLGHQFHDQGVWXGLHV´,3&&5 
2013, p. 5HJDUGLQJLQFUHDVHVLQ1RUWK$WODQWLFWURSLFDOF\FORQHDFWLYLW\³>W@KHUHUHPDLQV6 
substantial disagreement on the relative importance of internal variability, GHG forcing and 7 
DHURVROVIRUWKLVREVHUYHGWUHQG´(IPCC, 2013, p. 914). Since the release of the Fifth Assessment 8 
Report, diverse views have been published in the academic literature regarding the existence or 9 
otherwise of a slowdown in global surface warming (Karl et al., 2015; Fyfe et al., 2016).  10 
 11 
Acknowledging scientific dissensus in these matters is not the same as rejecting climate change as a 12 
global policy problem. What this does demonstrate, however, is that in the complex, multifaceted 13 
realm of climate science, relying on scientific consensus to cauterise public debate is a self-14 
defeating strategy. Climate science is complex and findings often contradictory and, most 15 
importantly, does not tell us anything about what to do about climate change. Consensus-seeking is 16 
neither a social requisite nor a normative ideal for a viable democracy (Rescher, 1993); 17 
acknowledging and valuing dissensus would allow a more publicly inclusive and accessible debate 18 
over approaches to climate change that do not prematurely foreclose particular policy options 19 
(Machin, 2013). Attempts to remove political conflict from climate change have proved to be a 20 
dead end, part of a troubling wider trend towards depoliticising key policy issues (Hay, 2007) and 21 
ZKLFKLVQRZEHLQJFDOOHGLQWRTXHVWLRQLQDQRQJRLQJµSRSXOLVW¶EDFNODVK   22 
  23 
 24 
 6 
The focus on quantifying scientific consensus as a way of trying to settle controversy or persuade 1 
the public to support specific policies reveals an unquestioned faith in a particular repertoire for 2 
producing, validating and using knowledge, what scholars in science and technology studies call 3 
µFLYLFHSLVWHPRORJ\¶ (Jasanoff, 2011; Miller, 2005). Consensus quantification is just one way of 4 
trying to resolve epistemic conflicts into useful evidence. Traditionally favoured in US 5 
environmental risk assessment, this approach has sometimes had the opposite effect of exacerbating 6 
controversy. For example, the attempt to identify and regulate potential carcinogens such as 7 
formaldehyde has foundered in an American regulatory system that demands quantified evidence of 8 
hazard and encourages adversarial scrutiny and endless deconstruction of competing evidentiary 9 
claims (Jasanoff, 1986).  10 
 11 
Quantification may well work in specific times and cultures as a way of making the unseen visible 12 
or of holding governments to account, or indeed, as a symbol around which a particular community 13 
coalesces. ,QWKLVZD\WKHµFRQVHQVXV¶PD\EHDQXPEHUDURXQGZKLFKWKRVHDOUHDG\14 
committed to climate change action who are inclined to trust climate scientists can rally (Corner & 15 
Roberts, 2014), rather than one which can be persuasive for other groups in political discussion 16 
(Kahan et al., 2011). Groups who are not persuaded by appeals to scientific authority as a 17 
MXVWLILFDWLRQIRUSROLF\PLJKWUDWLRQDOO\VHHNWRTXHVWLRQZKHWKHUVXFKVFLHQFHLVµVRXQG¶18 
(Demeritt, 2001), placing climate science under stresses it is ill-equipped to bear (Pearce et al., 19 
2015). Fundamentally, no set of calculations about epistemic consensus can help to tie people 20 
together in the absence of other social connections (Miller, 2005). For example, research in political 21 
psychology emphasises the importance of morality and values in binding together societal groups 22 
(Haidt, 2012; Lakoff, 2002) and in religious studies the role of cosmology and cultural identity 23 
(Wilson & Steger, 2013)  24 
 7 
 1 
POLICYMAKERS 2 
Even if one puts to one side the non-scientific characteristics of public communication, it is unwise 3 
to assume that closing the consensus gap will influence public policy. We present two reasons here. 4 
First, the literature on science and policy shows that the level of scientific agreement about an issue 5 
often has little influence on policy action. For example, before the Montreal negotiations to regulate 6 
chlorofluorocarbons, expectations for an ambitious treaty were low despite claims of a science 7 
consensus about long-term ozone depletion (Grundmann, 2001). However, the picture changed just 8 
SULRUWRWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWKWKHGLVFRYHU\RIWKH$QWDUFWLFµR]RQHKROH¶DGUDPDWLFFULVLVVLJQDO9 
that was in itself completely unexpected. Thus, the subsequent political agreement of the Montreal 10 
Protocol to regulate chlorofluorocarbons was more the result of the unexplained phenomenon of the 11 
µR]RQHKROH¶SURPSWLQJR]RQHGHSOHWLRQWREHDPDWWHURIFRQFHUQWKDQDQ\FRDOHVFLQJRIVFLHQWLILF12 
consensus. Influential narratives about the genesis of the Montreal Protocol maintain that not only 13 
was the process science driven, but that there was a scientific consensus that led to the political 14 
agreement (see Haas, 1992; Tolba, 2008). In fact, the process was driven by changing political 15 
constellations, mainly a U-turn of big chemical companies and the European Community, 16 
accompanied by the hot crisis signal of the µR]RQHKROH¶(for details, see Benedick, 1998; 17 
Grundmann, 2001). If anything moved policy towards the agreement in Montreal it was the 18 
discovery of the ozone hole, not the agreement among atmospheric scientists about future ozone 19 
losses. 20 
 21 
Second, an undue focus on scientific consensus brings about missteps in policy. By narrowing the 22 
terms of political debate about the desirability of this or that (or indeed any) climate policy to the 23 
physical sciences, scientific facts are used to substitute for matters of public concern. Legitimate 24 
 8 
and necessary public argument about whether a fact matters, and why, is short-circuited. Debates 1 
about the value of carbon emissions reductions are divorced from their social and political contexts 2 
(Cohen et al., 1998). For example, Pearce (2014) demonstrates how scientific consensus constitutes 3 
poor evidence for policy in the absence of compelling ideas and arguments, while Twyman et al. 4 
(2015) contrast the universal meaning of carbon as a scientific element with its complex local 5 
meanings within communities of the global South. In short, scientific consensus does not 6 
necessarily beget policy progress. Equally, policy progress is not necessarily dependent on 7 
acceptance of scientific consensus. The US nominee for Secretary of Energy, Governor Rick Perry, 8 
does not accept the consensus enumerated in the literature, yet still made Texas into ³WKHQDWLRQ¶V9 
leading generator of wind power, a renewable technology that he promoted heavily during his 14 10 
\HDUVLQRIILFH´0HUYLVAlso in the U.S., the Green Tea Party, a coalition of grassroots 11 
conservatives who have allied with environmentalists, predicates support for decentralised, solar 12 
energy primarily as an expression of libertarian values rather than as a means of reducing carbon 13 
emissions, enabling it to sidestep the cultural polarisation that exists around belief in human-caused 14 
climate change (Kormann, 2015). Research in the UK also emphasises the potential for concepts of 15 
patriotism and conservation as a means of building coalitions of support for climate policy with 16 
conservatives in the UK (Whitmarsh and Corner, 2017). 17 
 18 
While these examples demonstrate that the relationship between science and policy is not linear, we 19 
emphasise that scientific advice to policymakers remains a crucial element of democracy 20 
(Gluckman & Wilsdon, 2016). However, important and controversial issues within climate change, 21 
such as the effect of GHGs and aerosols on monsoonal weather systems and the the likelihood of 22 
ice-shelf collapse may not easily lend themselves to quantifiable claims of scientific consensus. 23 
Merely emphasising the strength of a narrowly drawn epistemic consensus underestimates the 24 
 9 
challenges of many of these issues. Expertise can play a role in policy deliberation and public 1 
endorsement, but it requires attention to judgment, context and diversity. What makes knowledge 2 
useful for policy is the ability to identify levers for action and an appreciation of how scientific 3 
advice will be interpreted and used in policy processes (Grundmann & Stehr, 2012; Geden, 2016). 4 
Engaging with this question of action inevitably means acknowledging different values and 5 
pathways forward. This opens up questions about the social dimensions of successful policy-6 
making, beyond fantasies of technocratic solutions.  7 
 8 
For political action on climate change, the messier work of engaging diverse publics across 9 
different scales and with different interests and affiliations is urgently needed (Jasanoff, 2010), 10 
particularly as there is strong evidence that linking climate to local issues is an important factor in 11 
successful policy implementation (Ryan, 2015). Climate change is conventionally framed as a 12 
global problem, causing tension with local policy implementation (Pearce, 2014). Thus, 13 
policymakers must often focus on other drivers in order to make successful arguments for policy; 14 
for example, improving local air quality or public transport (Ryan, 2015). In the absence of such 15 
connections, efforts to quantify scientific consensus about an abstract global process come across as 16 
strategies WRFORVHGRZQSROLWLFDOGHEDWHUDWKHUWKDQµPRYLQJLWRQ¶'HILQLQJWKHFHQWUDOSUREOHPLQ17 
terms of reducing carbon emissions has allowed technical fixes such as geo-engineering and low-18 
carbon energy to take centre-stage at the expense of a host of wider visions for social, economic and 19 
political change. We do not want to endorse any one of these, but merely wish to call attention to 20 
the many such visions of transformative innovation being put forward (Leach et al., 2012), and that 21 
debating these does not need to wait until a narrow scientifically-defined consensus has been 22 
achieved.  23 
 24 
 10 
BEYOND COUNTING CONSENSUS 1 
We have highlighted the limited public and policy value of enumerating consensus within climate 2 
science. A fundamental point is that, while knowledge and concerns about anthropogenic climate 3 
change have emerged mainly from scientific enquiry, responding to climate change is a deeply 4 
political process. Social media provide one means of studying the political life of climate change. 5 
For example, the publication of the 2014 IPCC report on the physical science of climate change 6 
prompted exchanges on social media that extended into political aspects of climate change such as 7 
the media¶VUROHLn publicising climate change, the politics of climate change within certain nation 8 
states, and activism around fracking (Pearce et al., 2014). This attachment of new public meanings 9 
to a scientific report opens a window into the politics of dissensus, rather than of consensus, which 10 
is critical to understand and engage with if widespread support for policy measures is to be gained. 11 
&OLPDWHFKDQJHLVDSROLWLFDOFKDOOHQJHZKHUHHVWDEOLVKLQJIDFWVVXFKDVµKXPDQVFDXVHFOLPDWH12 
FKDQJH¶LVODUJHO\LUUHOHYDQWWR the more important task of establishing which facts matter, to whom 13 
and why (Jasanoff, 2010). 14 
 15 
One implication for research arising from our argument is to better understand the forms and 16 
FRQGLWLRQVRINQRZOHGJHZKLFKµRSHQ-XS¶VSDFHVIRUFRQVWUXFWLYHSROLF\LQQRYDWLRQDQG17 
deliberation (Stirling, 2010). Centering on consensus about climate science in public debates does 18 
little to resolve the most pressing questions in climate policy design and implementation.  Instead, it 19 
distracts attention away from important practical challenges that highlight the need to negotiate 20 
between different scales of concern and action rather than box them into a linear relationship 21 
between scientific consensus and political action. These challenges include the need to: i) attend to, 22 
and work with, different local meanings of climate and climate change (Hulme, 2017) and their 23 
relationship to human institutions and behaviour (Jasanoff, 2010); ii) negotiate between concerns 24 
 11 
about the planet as a whole and local expressions of development rights and responsibilities 1 
(Jasanoff & Martello, 2004); and iii) find more inclusive ways of fostering innovation in cleaner 2 
energy technologies and selecting appropriate levels of investment in climate adaptation. These 3 
challenges may also represent opportunities to connect apparently disparate issues, human values 4 
and policy objectives in productive ways. But this requires developing skills in expert judgment 5 
across multiple spaces of science, political and public discussion (Hoppe, 2011; Raman, 2014) 6 
rather than a focus on scientific consensus. At some point, political questions will necessarily be 7 
closed down, at least temporarily, when policy decisions are taken. We argue that the legitimacy of 8 
such a closing down is achieved through a process of engaging with dissent on alternative policy 9 
pathways, and indeed, actively creating the conditions for a more diverse range of possibilities to be 10 
explored where these are not already apparent.  11 
 12 
CONCLUSION 13 
In this commentary, we have argued that repeated efforts to shore up the scientific consensus on 14 
minimalisWFODLPVVXFKDVµKXPDQVFDXVHJOREDOZDUPLQJ¶DUHGLVWUDFWLRQVIURPWKHPRUHXUJHQW15 
matters of knowledge, values, policy framing and public engagement.  We maintain that researchers 16 
concerned about the relationship of knowledge to policy would be better advised to invest their 17 
efforts in these areas rather than in exercises of quantifying consensus about tightly drawn 18 
statements of scientific fact. This lesson goes beyond climate change and should be acknowledged 19 
by those hoping that communicating scientific consensus can defuse other environmental 20 
controversies, such as around genetically modified organisms (e.g., Lynas, 2016). In short, we need 21 
the skills for developing and deploying expert judgment in practical contexts, rather than 22 
quantitative techniques for capturing consensus in climate science and then using such metrics as a 23 
rhetorical driver of climate policy.  24 
 12 
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